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Abstract
The Parrondo’s paradox is a counter-intuitive phenomenon in which individually losing strategies,
canonically termed Game A and Game B, are combined to produce winning outcomes. In this
paper, a co-evolution of game dynamics and network structure is adopted to study adaptability
and survivability in multi-agent dynamics. The model includes Action A, representing a rewiring
process on the network, and a two-branch Game B, representing redistributive interactions between
agents. Simulation results indicate that stochastically mixing Action A and Game B can produce
enhanced, and even winning outcomes, despite Game B being individually losing. In other words,
a Parrondo-type paradox can be achieved, but unlike canonical variants, the source of agitation is
provided by passive network evolution instead of an active second game. The underlying paradoxical
mechanism is analyzed, revealing that the rewiring process drives a topology shift from initial
regular lattices towards scale-free characteristics, and enables exploitative behavior that grants
enhanced access to the favourable branch of Game B.
Keywords: Network rewiring, dynamic networks, Parrondo’s paradox, complex networks
1. Introduction
The mechanistic removal and rewiring of connections between nodes promote structural evolu-
tion of complex networks [1]. When complex networks are utilized as a modelling basis for multi-
agent systems, the topological features resulting from these processes, such as emergent scale-free,
small-world and community structural properties, can be expected to carry significant impact on
system dynamical behavior. In particular, it is reasonable to inquire whether network evolution
may promote group adaptability and survivability, such that formally sub-optimal behavioral pat-
terns yield improved outcomes—in other words, whether Parrondo-type paradoxes can be achieved.
Investigating the possibility and feasibility conditions of these paradoxes, and more broadly the
effects of network evolution on multi-agent game dynamics, is the focus of this paper.
A characterizing property of canonical Parrondo-type game pairs is the achievement of winning
outcomes through the combination of individually losing strategies [2]. An agitation-ratcheting
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mechanism underlies the exhibited paradoxical behavior, typically realized through asymmetry in
the branching structure of Game B, such that some branches are favourable (of a higher winning
probability), and some are unfavourable (of a higher losing probability). This asymmetric structure
forms a ratchet. On the other hand, Game A serves an agitating role, to the effect of perturbing
the capital of the player. The agitation from Game A can lead to increased likelihood of land-
ing in favourable branches when Game B is subsequently invoked, thus manifesting a ratcheting
mechanism and enabling the characteristic paradoxical winning outcomes. There have been many
examples of such counter-intuitive dynamics studied to date, for instance, in ecological popula-
tions [3–10], population genetics [11–13], physical quantum systems [14–19], reliability theory [20],
system design optimization [21, 22], and the Allison mixture in information thermodynamics [23].
A greatly illustrative example is that of the catfish effect, deriving from observations of Nor-
wegian fishermen that the forced cohabitation of captured sardines and predatory catfishes can,
in fact, be beneficial to sardine yield. The introduction of catfishes into sardine holding tanks
stimulates sardine movement, keeping the sardines alive and therefore fresh for a longer duration.
A motile state is hence interpretable as winning, whereas inactivity or death reflects a losing state.
Modelling this as a game pair, Game A then refers to the situation where sardines are in proximity
to an active catfish, in which death due to predation (losing) is more likely than survival (winning).
Game A is hence losing. A two-branch Game B, on the other hand, models sardine behavior when
the catfish is absent or otherwise inactive at predation. In Branch 1, the sardines are surrounded
by more swimming (winning) individuals, and the probability of winning is large as the surround-
ing sardines sustain a mixing of water and reduces the risk of hypoxia. In Branch 2, the sardines
are surrounded by more inactive (losing) individuals, and the probability of losing is large due to
hypoxia. The tendency of sardines to reduce energy expenditure means that, in the absence of
catfishes, the sardine group is likely to invoke Branch 2, the unfavourable branch; however, with
catfish present (Game A), the group is likely to swim to avoid predation, invoking the favourable
Branch 1. This leads to the observed catfish effect.
The catfish effect demonstrates the keystone importance of agitation in realizing paradoxical
outcomes—indeed, if the agitating Game A is absent, the ratcheting mechanism cannot at all
take effect. In similar vein, the diversity of Parrondo-type paradoxes examined in literature com-
monly rely on agitation provided by an active game, analogous to Game A, to drive ratcheting
in an accompanying game. In the current paper, we propose the use of passive network evolution
mechanisms—with no dependence nor influence on agent capital—to provide agitative effects, in
replacement of the active Game A. Existing research relevant to such a construction is notably
limited. A previous study had indicated plausible agitative contributions from network rewiring on
one-dimensional line and two-dimensional lattice topologies [24], but the results were constrained
to regular networks with isomorphic neighborhoods for all nodes. To maintain network regular-
ity, the rewiring process was also constrained to maintain node degrees. These restrictions had
enabled simplicity in the mathematics of Game B but compromises applicability, for networks
useful in modelling real-world phenomena are typically non-regular, and rewiring processes do not
necessarily preserve degree distributions.
The shift from the canonical active perturbative sources to a passive one is a key contribution of
this study. We adopt an Action A + Game B framework, modelling passive network evolution and
multi-agent redistributive capital dynamics respectively, to investigate the possibility of emergent
Parrondo-type paradoxes. Our results indicate that network structure evolution can indeed enhance
group adaptability and survivability, in some cases with sufficiently strong effect as to turn formerly
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losing behaviors into winning ones. The mechanism underlying these paradoxical outcomes is also
elucidated, with novel analyses on evolutionary topological trends towards scale-free characteristics.
2. Methods
Here, we present a general model comprising a passive rewiring-driven network evolution mech-
anism, Action A, and a game capturing multi-agent capital dynamics, Game B. The structure of
the adopted Game B is shown in Figure 1, adapted from a previous study [25]. For each indi-
vidual, represented as nodes in the network, the two branches of Game B is selected on a basis
of comparison between the capital of the individual Ci and the mean capital of its neighbors C
†
i .
This branching structure reflects a degree of correlation (or anticorrelation) between the welfare of
individuals and their environments, as is indeed expected in the real-world. In Branch 1, played
when Ci ≤ C†i , the winning probability is p1, and in Branch 2, played when Ci > C†i , the winning
probability is p2. Accordingly, the losing probabilities are (1 − p1) and (1 − p2) respectively. We
take winning and losing outcomes at each game round to respectively result in a unit increment
and decrement in the capital of the individual. It is notable that the current construction is gen-
eral to node degree, and is hence compatible with rewiring processes that do not preserve degree
distributions, unlike prior models [25, 26].
Game B
Branch 1 Branch 2
win lose win lose
Ci ≤
∑
j∼iCj/Ki Ci >
∑
j∼iCj/Ki
p1 1− p1 p2 1− p2
Figure 1: Construction of Game B on arbitrary complex networks [25]. The summation is taken over the neighbours
j of node i, j ∼ i. Ki denotes the degree (number of neighbours) of node i.
As discussed in the introduction, to enhance the relevance of the network evolution model to
real-world systems, the adopted rewiring mechanism is vastly different from previously developed
variants [24]. There is no constraint in the current rewiring mechanism that the number of neighbors
of all nodes be preserved throughout the evolution process. The adopted rewiring mechanism,
Action A, can be described as follows:
Step 1: Node i is selected randomly from the network. If the degree of all neighbors of node i is
1, then node i is re-selected.
Step 2: Node j is randomly selected from the neighbors of node i. If the degree of node j is 1,
then node j is re-selected. If all the neighbors of node j are connected to node i (or is node i
itself), then node j is re-selected. In the case that it is not possible to select node j satisfying
these properties, then return to Step 1 and re-select node i.
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t t+1
Action A (rewiring process)
i j
m
break 
connectioni j
m
new  
connection
Figure 2: Illustration of a single stpe in the random rewiring mechanism of Action A. New connection (thick line)
is created between I and m and connection between i and j is removed (dotted line). For the sake of clarity only
N = 9 nodes are shown.
Step 3: Node m is randomly selected from the neighbors of the node j. If nodes m and i are
identical or are connected, then node m is re-selected.
Step 4: The connection between node i and node j is broken, and a connection between nodes m
and i is formed.
An illustration of the mechanism of Action A is shown in Figure 2.Action A and Game B
can occur individually in the network over a duration of time, such that at each time step t,
only Action A or Game B consistently occurs. Alternatively, a stochastically mixed Action A
+ Game B can be implemented, such that at each time step, either Action A or Game B is
selected to occur on a random basis. We denote the total population gains of game B and the
stochastically mixed Action A + Game B as W (B)(t) and W (A+B)(t) respectively. Here, W (t) =∑N
i=1 (Ci(t)− C0), where C0 is the initial capital, taken to be equivalent for all individuals, Ci(t)
is the capital of individual i at time t, and N is the number of individuals (population size) in the
network. In ecological or social-dynamical systems, for instance, the capital can be taken to refer
to the wealth or welfare of each individual, and the population gain is then a measure of the growth
of wealth or welfare of the entire group.
A Parrondo-type paradox then occurs when the stochastically mixed Action A + Game B
produces winning results, despite Game B being individually losing. Such a paradox is characterized
by the condition
W (A+B)(t) ≥ 0, W (B)(t) < 0. (1)
3. Results & Discussion
Key simulation results and accompanying analyses are presented in this section, starting with
observations on the occurrence of a Parrondo-type paradox in the model (Section 3.1), network evo-
lution trends (Section 3.2), elucidation of the underlying mechanism responsible for the paradoxical
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outcomes (Sections 3.3 and 3.4), and the presence of a critical rewiring duration after which posi-
tive population gains can be maintained even without rewiring (Section 3.5). For all simulations,
an initial two-dimensional lattice network of N = 60 × 60 nodes was adopted. The initial capital
of all individuals is taken to be C0 = 500, and Action A or Game B are played with identical
probabilities of 1/2 on each round for stochastic mixing, over a period of T = 1.8× 105 rounds.
3.1. Occurrence of Parrondo-like paradoxes
Figure 3(a) presents simulation results with pure Action A, pure Game B, and stochastically
mixed Action A + Game B configurations. It is observed that Action A alone does not result in
any population gain, as is trivially expected from a passive rewiring process, whereas Game B and
Action A + Game B can result in both negative and positive population gains. Importantly, there
exist regions in parameter space where Parrondo-type paradoxes occur—the combined Action A
+ Game B can result in enhanced population gain as compared to Game B individually, and
even produce positive gain when Game B is losing. These parameter spaces demonstrate that the
passive network rewiring process captured in Action A can serve effectively as an agitative source
to sustain ratcheting when mixed with the capital redistributive dynamics of Game B.
As an illustrative example, we examine p1 = 0.885 and p2 = 0.010, whose corresponding
evolution of population gain W (t) is presented in Figure 3(b). It is clear that Game B individually
produces a losing result over the long-term, whereas the stochastically mixed Action A + Game B
leads to a sustained winning outcome. In addition, Figure 3(c) presents the evolution of d = W (t)/t,
indicative of the per-round population gain. As can be observed, d gradually converges toward
stable values. Game B individually produces steady-state d = −0.0035 < 0, reflecting a losing
game, and Action A + Game B produces steady-state d = 0.0090 > 0, reflecting a winning game.
3.2. Network structure evolution
To probe further into the underlying mechanism of this paradoxical effect, an analysis of the
evolution of network structure is required. We define the average path length L of the network [27]
as the average distance between any two nodes:
L =
2
N(N − 1)
∑
1≤i≤j≤N
dij , (2)
where N is the network size and dij denotes the distance between nodes i and j in the network as
measured on the shortest connecting path.
Furthermore, the clustering coefficient C [27] of the network is defined as the average of clustering
coefficients Ci of node i, for all nodes within the network. This is expressed as
Ci = 2Ei
ki(ki − 1) (3a)
C = 1
N
∑
1≤i≤N
Ci (3b)
where ki is the degree of node i, and Ei is the number of edges among these ki neighbouring nodes.
The time-evolution of the average path length L and the clustering coefficient C of the network
are shown in Figure 4(a) and 4(b), under the selected parameters. The network structure is static
when playing Game B individually—the degree of all nodes in the two-dimensional lattice remains
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Figure 3: (a) Simulation results of Action A only, Game B only, and the stochastically mixed Action A + Game
B, across p1–p2 probability space. Blue highlights indicate regions where the Parrondo-type paradox occur. The
presented data were averaged over 30 trials. (b) Change in total population gain W (t) as time progresses, with
p1 = 0.885 and p2 = 0.010. (c) Change in W (t)/t as time progresses, for the same parameter combination. The
presented data were obtained as an average over 100 trials.
at K = 4, and L ≈ 30. There are no connections between neighbors of each node, therefore C = 0.
With network evolution from Action A, there is first a rapid drop in L and a rapid rise in C. This
suggests a shift towards a random or small-world topology. As evolution progresses, L eventually
stabilizes at L ≈ 5.2, whereas C declines after reaching a peak of C ≈ 0.1 and eventually stabilizes
at C ≈ 0.004. The short average path length and small clustering coefficient appear consistent
with scale-free networks. Furthermore, it can be observed that Action A individually produces
a faster evolution of network topology than the stochastically mixed Action A + Game B, as
reflected by the time difference in changes of L and C. The reason for this is that in Action A +
Game B, on average half of the elapsed game rounds are spent on Game B, which does not entail
network evolution; on the other hand the full proportion of game rounds drive network evolution
in Action A alone.
The shift in network topology is further confirmed with an analysis on the degree distribution
of the network, as presented in Figure 4(c). It is observed that the degree distribution morphs from
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Figure 4: Evolution of (a) average path length L and (b) clustering coefficient C of the network for Action A only,
Game B only, and stochastically mixed Action A + Game B. (c) Degree distribution of the network at varying
time values as the stochastically mixed Action A + Game B progresses, illustrating a shift from initial regularity,
to a normal-like distribution, and finally to a power-law distribution. Parameters are p1 = 0.885 and p2 = 0.010,
corresponding to the demonstrative case shown previously in Figure 3(b)–(c).
the δ-distribution of the initial lattice to a normal-like distribution as evolution progresses, in turn
eventually shifting into a power-law distribution. In our proposed rewiring process, if the degree
of all neighbors of node is 1, then node is re-selected. To some extent, this has a ”preferential
attachment” effect. The initial network is a two-dimensional lattice network. With evolution from
Action A, nodes with a single neighbour will gradually appear. These nodes will no longer be
selected in subsequent rounds of network evolution. Therefore, with the increase of time, the set
of nodes participating in Action A will become smaller. This leads to the formation of a tail,
which may be the reason why the degree distribution becomes power-law over time. Curve-fitting
on the degree distribution data have been performed to quantitatively confirm this trend, with
results presented in Table 1. Summarizing these results, under the rewiring process of Action A,
the network structure gradually evolves from the initial two-dimensional lattice towards a scale-
free network. A stabilization of the network structure is observed after approximately t = 105, as
reflected in the approach towards steady-state in Figures 4(a)–(c).
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Table 1: Curve-fitting results on network degree distribution data at varying time values, corresponding to Figure
4(c).
Time t Best-Fit Distribution Function
1.0× 103 Normal P (k) = 0.7718 exp
[
− ( k−3.993
0.7114
)2]
1.0× 104 Normal P (k) = 0.2709 exp
[
− ( k−3.784
2.061
)2]
5.0× 104 Normal P (k) = 0.2181 exp
[
− ( k+1.405
7.279
)2]
1.0× 105 Power Law P (k) = 0.2971k−1.023
1.8× 105 Power Law P (k) = 0.3369k−1.143
3.3. Macroanalysis on paradoxical mechanism
The examined case of p1 = 0.885 > 1/2 and p2 = 0.010 < 1/2 implies that Branch 1 is
favourable (large winning probability) and Branch 2 in unfavourable (large losing probability).
The expected gain E of Game B can be computed as
E = pi1 (2p1 − 1) + pi2 (2p2 − 1) , (4)
where pi1 and pi2 represent the stationary distribution probabilities of Branch 1 and Branch 2 of
Game B respectively. Under p1 = 0.885 and p2 = 0.010, the condition for a fair Game B (E = 0)
can be calculated to be pi†1 = 0.56 and pi
†
2 = 0.44.
At each game round, the average probability pi1 of playing Branch 1 of Game B can be computed
by comparing the capital of each node with the mean capital of its neighbors. This is presented
in Figure 5. When the system settles into steady-state, pi1 stabilizes at 0.5541 when Game B is
individually played; but this probability is raised to 0.5640 for the stochastically mixed Action A
+ Game B. It follows from the fair-game condition that a winning outcome will result in the long-
term if the steady-state pi1 exceeds pi
†
1, and vice versa, indeed consistent with the observation that
Game B individually is losing but Action A + Game B is winning. In other words, the paradoxical
mechanism can be deduced to hinge upon the network structure evolution in Action A, which raises
the chance of playing the favourable branch of Game B in subsequent rounds. This effect is large
enough to overcome the losing tendency of Game B and produce positive population gains.
3.4. Microanalysis on positive population gains
The criticality of network evolution in the underlying ratcheting mechanism has been suggested
by the previous analysis, but the adopted statistical approach does not reveal the exact pathways
through which network structure influence branch probabilities and hence long-term outcomes. We
therefore seek a micro-scale analysis. To facilitate discussions, we divide the population gain into
three contributory parts—gain of all nodes of degree Ki ≤ 5, gain of all nodes of 6 < Ki ≤ 20,
and gain of all nodes of Ki > 20. The gain in these three subpopulations over time is tracked
and presented in Figure 6(a), and the probability pi1 of the subpopulations playing the favourable
Branch 1 is shown in Figure 6(b).
It is observed in Figure Figure 6(a) that the primary source of population gain (close to 90%) is
due to contributions from the Ki ≤ 5 subpopulation, followed by the 6 < Ki ≤ 20 subpopulation,
with the Ki > 20 subpopulation essentially negligible. At the same time, it is observed from Figure
6(b) that the probability of playing Branch 1 pi1 in the Ki ≤ 5 and 6 < Ki ≤ 20 subpopulations is
consistently greater than the fair-game threshold of 0.56, thus indicating the steady generation of
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Figure 5: The probability pi1 of entering Branch 1 in Game B, plotted for both a pure Game B sequence, and
stochastically mixed Action A + Game B. The fair-game threshold of pi†1 = 0.56 is also plotted. Parameters are
p1 = 0.885 and p2 = 0.010, corresponding to the demonstrative case shown previously in Figure 3(b)–(c)
.
positive gain. In comparison, pi1 in the Ki > 20 subpopulation exhibits great volatility, suggesting
rapid switching of the neighboring environments of these large-degree nodes between favorable and
unfavorable conditions.
At steady-state, the average gains of subpopulations of each node degree, and their probabili-
ties pi1 of playing Branch 1, can be computed—these results are presented in Figure 7(a) and 7(b)
respectively. Figure 7(a) confirms that the overall population gain results largely from small- and
medium-degree nodes, and reveals significant polarization on large-degree nodes with alternating
positive and negative average gains, averaging to negligible levels as had previously been observed.
This polarization is similarly reflected in Figure 7(b). Essentially, a portion of large-degree nodes
have neighbouring environments that are greatly favourable in inducing Branch 1, and a portion
have environments greatly unfavourable, leading to the large spread in pi1 and gain. It can, fur-
thermore, be seen that during the evolution towards steady-state, the gain and degree of each
large-degree node display large-amplitude oscillatory characteristics. This is shown in Figure 8.
These results indicate a number of key facets in the paradoxical mechanism—there is a char-
acteristic oscillatory pattern in the gain of large-degree nodes, there is an on-average alteration
of the probability of entering the favourable Branch 1, and the rewiring process of Action A is
responsible for producing paradoxical positive gains from an originally losing game, with the accom-
panying shift in degree distribution potentially playing a notable role. The underlying micro-scale
mechanism may be summarized as follows:
(1) Each large-degree node is typically connected to a large number of small- and medium-degree
neighbors. Suppose an arbitrary large-degree node has gain E at a certain time. A large E is
beneficial to the neighbors of the large-degree node, as it raises their chances of playing the
favourable Branch 1 under Game B. However, the resultant growth in capital of its neighbors
is unfavourable to the large-degree node itself, as an increase in mean neighbor capital lowers
its chances of playing Branch 1. The gain E of the large-degree node will hence be eventually
reduced.
(2) These mechanics essentially mandate an inverse relationship between the gains of large-degree
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Figure 6: (a) Total gain of the Ki ≤ 5, 6 < Ki ≤ 20, and Ki > 20 subpopulations over time. (b) Plot of probability
pi1 of playing Branch 1 of Game B over time, for the Ki ≤ 5, 6 < Ki ≤ 20, and Ki > 20 subpopulations.
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Figure 7: (a) Steady-state average gain of subpopulations of differing node degree. (b) Steady-state probability pi1
of playing Branch 1 of Game B for subpopulations of differing node degree.
nodes and its neighbors. At some point, E will have decreased sufficiently to become un-
favourable to the neighbors, and the resulting decrease in mean capital of the neighbors is
in turn favourable to the large-degree node. The gain E will then increase, and the cycle
repeats. In other words, the adversity between the large-degree node and its neighbors facil-
itates reversal behavior as the game progresses. This explains the alternating characteristics
of the gain and pi1 of large-degree nodes previously observed in Figures 7 to 8.
3.5. Sustained necessity of network rewiring agitation
Considering the rewiring-driven mechanism inducing paradoxical population gains, it is mean-
ingful to question if continued rewiring must occur to maintain positive outcomes, or if beyond a
certain threshold, rewiring can be removed with no resultant regression. The latter may hypotheti-
cally be possible, if the initial period of rewiring is sufficient to bring the network towards a suitable
topology for small-degree nodes to benefit effectively from the oscillatory patterns of larger-degree
neighbors.
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Figure 8: (a) Evolution of the gain of a typical large-degree node over time, showing characteristic oscillatory patterns.
(b) Evolution of the degree of a typical large-degree node over time.
To investigate such a possibility, we omit Action A after the stochastically mixed Action A +
Game B has been played for a certain period of time t∗, such that Game B is played individually
for the remaining duration. The simulation results are presented in Figure 9(a)–(d), for various
values of t∗. It is observed from Figures 9(a)–(c) that the omission of Action A at too early a
duration prevents the system from sustaining positive population gains, as the network topology is
insufficiently evolved before entering steady-state. On the other hand,Figure 9(d) demonstrates that
when t∗ is sufficiently large (& 105), the system can still generate and retain a positive population
gain.
This indicates that beyond a certain period of agitation via network rewiring, the attained
steady-state network structure should rewiring be disabled can confer adequate environments for
small-degree nodes to sustain the exploitative mechanism. It can also be noted from Figure 4 that
beyond t = 105, the scale-free characteristics of the network structure are stable, indeed supporting
this deduction. Even if rewiring is continued, Figure 9(d) shows rapidly diminishing returns, and
beyond t = 3× 105, the agitation effect of Action A can no longer render a growth in population
gains. There is therefore a matching value between the required duration of agitative rewiring
(Action A) and the network size, exceeding which the system effectively becomes passive and
insignificant further growth can be achieved.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, a stochastically mixed model of Action A + Game B was developed to study
the effects of network co-evolution on group behavior adaptability and welfare dynamics. In the
constructed model, Action A reflects a rewiring process that drives evolution of network struc-
ture, and hence the survival environment of individuals, while Game B reflects survival mechanics
between interacting individuals. The influence of the environment on the survivability of individ-
uals typically comprise both favourable and unfavourable facets, hence Game B was constructed
with two branches, of which Branch 1 reflects favorable influence and Branch 2 reflects adverse
influence.
The key result of the current study is that Parrondo-type paradoxes can occur when network
rewiring (Action A) is stochastically mixed with multi-agent redistributive mechanics (Game B)—
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Figure 9: Plots of total population gain against time when the agitative Action A is omitted after a period of time
t∗, for (a) t∗ = 103, (b) t∗ = 104, (c) 8× 104, and (d) 105. In (d), simulation results for both the omission of Action
A after t∗ (case 1), and the sustained progression of Action A + Game B (case 2), are shown for comparative
purposes.
that is, mixed Action A + Game B can produce long-term enhanced and even winning outcomes,
despite Game B being losing individually. It is notable that this result exhibits fundamental
differences to the canonical paradoxes produced by Parrondo-type game pairs. In these canoni-
cal paradoxes, winning outcomes are produced from the interaction of two active played games
(Game A and Game B), whereas Action A examined here is a purely passive process, independent
of the capital of agents. The result, in other words, is that interaction between a passive process
and a single game can produce paradoxes.
Through an extensive analysis, the mechanism underlying the occurrence of such paradoxes
has been elucidated. Simplistically, rewiring operations shuffle connections between small-degree
and large-degree nodes, thereby enabling small-degree nodes to have a greater on-average chance
of invoking the favourable Branch 1 through exploitation of oscillatory behavior of their large-
degree neighbors. The evolution of the network structure from the initial lattice topology towards
small-world and scale-free networks further facilitates such a mechanism. It is also revealed that
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rewiring need not be continued indefinitely for the system to maintain positive outcomes, as be-
yond a threshold duration, the network structure can become adequately conducive to sustain the
paradoxical mechanism.
The common emergence of multi-agent competitive-cooperative behavior and interaction struc-
ture has indeed been reported in prior literature, typically analyzed through game-theoretic frame-
works. Game benefits generated by competitive and cooperative relationships among individuals
oftentimes indicate a degree of group adaptability. A variety of game models and contexts have
been examined in these existing works, including the prisoner’s dilemma model [28, 29], the snow-
drift game [30, 31], the public goods game [32, 33], and the ultimatum game [34, 35], reflecting
differing competitive and cooperative dynamics between individuals. Our current results will aid
in the understanding of individual rationality and mobility in their communities, and the group
advantages they can potentially confer. In this respect, an ecologically-relevant example is that of
emperor penguins, which exhibits coordinated group behavior for survival in cold environmental
conditions. Emperor penguins typically cluster in close proximity to conserve heat, but individuals
in the outer ranks lose heat more quickly, and are at risk of freezing. If the outer ranks fall, the
entire formation will crumple layer by layer. This is detrimental to the entire group. The penguins
therefore adopt a dynamic ’transposition’ group behavior, similar to the rewiring process of Ac-
tion A, that exchanges individuals between inner and outer ranks. Through this passive process,
the risks of outer ranks freezing and inner ranks overheating are reduced.
The current study has focused on strictly passive rewiring mechanisms (independent of agent
capitals), as such a regime is greatly complementary to the current understanding of Parrondo-type
frameworks. In particular, the evolution of background dependencies between agents in the real-
world is seldom tied to direct changes in capital—for instance, changes in the social network of an
individual does not immediately alter career and financial standing, but may nonetheless eventually
influence progression indirectly. A passive mechanism is needed to model such phenomena. Variants
of capital-dependent rewiring, such as preferential rewiring towards high-capital or low-capital
nodes, can be investigated in future studies.
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